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A U T H O R

John Ghaelian

I

am undergraduate senior majoring in both English
and history.  The work that I present here was done
for my senior thesis for my honors history class.  
By making extensive use of Senator Alben W. Barkley’s
archives located in the M.I. King Special Collections in
the library, I was able to explore the role Senator Barkley had on the Democratic presidential ticket in 1948.
One of the greatest assets that I had while working
on the project was my professor and mentor Dr. Kathi Kern of the history department.  Dr. Kern constantly pushed me and the other students in the class
to produce better work and probe deeper into our research.  Her efforts were
instrumental in making my thesis the work that it is today.  I was incredibly
fortunate to have her as a professor and will always be indebted to the direction and encouragement that she gave me while working on this project.
While attending UK, I was active in a number of student organizations
including: Phi Alpha Theta, College Democrats, and UK Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth.

Alben W. Barkley:
Harry S. Truman’s
Unexpected Political
Asset
Excerpt from a Gaines Thesis

Faculty Mentor:
Dr. Katherine Lee Kern, Department of History
I am writing to convey my endorsement of John Ghalien’s
paper: “Alben W. Barkley: Harry S. Truman’s Unexpected
Political Asset.”  John wrote this paper, his senior thesis,
in my history 471 class.  Therefore, I am quite familiar with
the research and the resulting paper.  It was very exciting
to work with John because he really wanted to engage in
original research.  So, although his course work had led him to study Ancient
history, the excellent source material housed in UK’s Special Collections and
Archives beckoned John into the twentieth century.  Because he is deeply
engaged in the current Presidential election, John was drawn to the controversies surrounding an earlier Presidential election, Truman’s victory in
1948.  John was particularly curious about the historical amnesia that has
crept up around this election.  Alben Barkley, the vice-presidential nominee
from Kentucky, has largely been forgotten in the national narratives.  But, as
John argues, this oversight needs to be corrected.  Truman’s presidency has
experienced a renaissance, thanks in part to a popular biography by David
McCullough.  But, what about Barkley?  As John demonstrates in his paper,
Barkley helped to deliver the South to Truman and to keep the South an
important player in the Democratic Party.  When we consider the political
landscape of the decades that followed, and particularly the success of the
Republican Party in capturing Southern voters on cultural issues, Barkley’s
unique genius seems particularly significant.

I. Introduction
On April 30, 1956 the great orator and Senator
Alben Barkley loudly proclaimed, “I’m glad to sit
in the back row, for I would rather be a servant in
the house of the Lord than sit in the seats of the
mighty.” He than took a step back to accept the
thunderous applause of the audience. Suddenly,
he collapsed to the ground. His wife Jane hurried
to the stage; but it was too late, he had died of a
heart attack. Since his death, Barkley has largely
been forgotten by history. Despite this historical
amnesia, Barkley had a long and distinguished
career of public service that has been ignored. He
served in a variety of elected offices and played
major roles in the political debates of his times.
The few scholars who have written about Barkley
have focused mainly on his early career and his
time as Senate Majority leader. Few Americans
know of his rousing keynote address in 1948,
his “prop-stop” campaign, or that he served as
Truman’s vice-president and was given the nickname the “VEEP.”  In particular, little attention
has been given to Barkley’s pivotal role in the
1948 election.
While Barkley has faded from view, the man
he propelled into the presidency has gained in
historical stature.  Harry Truman’s upset victory
over Thomas Dewey has been closely examined
by historians, e.g., Donaldson, Truman Defeats
Dewey; Karabell, The Last Campaign: How Harry
Truman Won the 1948 Election; and McCullough,
Truman.   All are major works that focus on
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Truman and his reelection efforts, but none of these give
Barkley any serious attention. The picture of Truman
holding the Chicago Daily Tribune with the headline
“Dewey defeats Truman” and the memory of his whistle
stop campaign have become icons of American political
history. While Truman’s role in the campaign has been
examined, Barkley’s contributions to the race have
been overlooked. Barkley’s popularity — both in the
country and in the Democratic Party — political skills,
and remarkable speaking ability bolstered Truman’s
reelection efforts significantly by keeping most of the
South in the Democratic column and by picking up
traditionally Republican states in the Midwest.

II. Early Career
Barkley was born on November 24, 1877, in a small
log cabin in Graves county Kentucky. While attending
Marvin College, a small Methodist University, Barkley
joined Marvin’s Periclean Debating Society where he
learned to hone his speaking and debate skills.   His
first elected position was county attorney in 1905, but it
was not long before Barkley ran for federal office. (Libbey, 1979)  In 1912, Barkley was elected to the House
of Representatives where he earned a reputation as a
progressive Democrat by working closely with President
Woodrow Wilson on enacting a number of reforms. This
work led to his political maturity. Barkley “assumed
Wilson’s vision of America as a nation where individual
enterprise and competition should not be jeopardized by
monopoly capitalism.” (Libbey, 1979, p. 67)  The young
Kentucky Congressman worked with the Chief Executive
to lower tariffs and to pass both the Federal Reserve Act
and the Clayton Anti Trust Act. Working with Wilson
prepared him for his partnership with Roosevelt, with
whom he would work closely on several pieces of New
Deal legislation.
The United States Senate gained a new member in
1926 after Barkley managed to win a close primary and
general election. (Hatfield, 1997, p. 424)   During the
campaign, Barkley had been forced to unite the different
factions of the Democratic Party in Kentucky.  This would
prove to be important in his Senate career. Historian
James K. Libbey writes, “The knack he possessed to
conciliate factions and ingratiate himself among potential opponents would serve him well as a distinguished
representative from Kentucky to the United States Senate.” (Libbey, 1979, p. 48)  Barkley’s time in the Senate
would introduce him to the national stage and earn him
a reputation as a strong proponent and defender of the
New Deal and the Democratic Party.
The Senator’s rise in importance caused him to be
selected to give the Democratic keynote address to his
party’s convention in 1932. His success there would lead
to him giving the keynote address again in 1936, 1940,
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and 1948. Barkley reached an even larger audience when
his party selected him to defend the New Deal against
Henry Fletcher, the chairman of the Republican Party, in a
radio address. He was so successful that his party selected
him to, “confute the Republicans in 1934 congressional
elections, when he launched a twenty-state blitzkrieg to
defend the New Deal and its candidates.” (Libbey, 1979,
p. 67)  The radio address that Barkley gave led to higher
name recognition with the general public; which in turn
caused FDR to use him in his legislative efforts more.
President Roosevelt relied on Barkley to help pass
many of his reforms including: the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Act), NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act),
and FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Act). (Libbey, 1979,
p. 66) On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court declared
several pieces of New Deal legislation unconstitutional,
including the NIRA. Roosevelt was infuriated by the
Court’s actions. He called a special session of Congress
and unveiled the second New Deal which included
the Banking Act, Social Security Act, and the Wagner
Relations Act. Roosevelt would not forget or forgive the
Court’s decision.
The Democrats headed to their convention in 1936,
with FDR’s second New Deal in mind. Barkley gave the
keynote address and used it to defend the New Deal,
attack the Hoover administration, and praise the accomplishments of the president. Barkley also attacked
the Supreme Court. He asked the audience “Is the court
beyond criticism? May it be regarded as too sacred to
be disagreed with?” By striking down the NIRA, the
Supreme Court had infuriated Barkley, because he felt
the legislation to be vital for improving America’s economic woes.  Barkley did not comprehend, “that within
his keynote address lay the seeds of future Democratic
discord, nationwide controversy, and a tragic event that,
nonetheless, would elevate Barkley to new heights
of leadership and responsibility.” (Libbey, 199, p. 71)  
Roosevelt and Barkley collaborated to ensure that the
Supreme Court would not strike down any more New
Deal legislation.
On February 5, 1937 the president gave Congress
legislation to reorganize the Federal Judiciary. He did so
without giving his allies in Congress any warning. This
action was quickly labeled as Roosevelt’s “court-packing”
plan.  The bill allowed the president to appoint a new
federal judge for every member of the bench above the
age of seventy. If Congress had enacted the measure, FDR
would have had the power to appoint six new justices.
Americans were outraged by the president’s attempts to
reorganize the Supreme Court with political allies who
would support his legislative agenda. The conservative
wing of the Democratic Party was equally outraged
and revolted against the plan. Senate Majority Leader
Joseph Robinson and Barkley both supported the bill,
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Barkley speaking in Louisville
and attempted to convince other Democrats of its merits.
In the midst of the legislative battle Robinson died of a
heart attack leaving Barkley acting Majority Leader. With
Robinson’s death any hope for FDR’s court packing plan
ended. (Hatfield, 1977, p. 424)

III. Barkley as Majority Leader
Barkley’s loyalty to Roosevelt during his court packing
scheme led to the president backing him for Senate
Majority Leader. FDR leaned on state Democratic leaders to pressure their Senators to back Barkley.  Also, on
July 15, 1937, he addressed a public letter to “My dear
Alben” signifying his support. (Barkley Papers, Box 61,
Folder 1) The conservative wing of the party largely
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backed Pat Harrison of Mississippi who had argued
vehemently against the “court-packing” plan. (Krock,
1937, p. 16)  During the leadership contest, Barkley had
his first intimate contact with Truman.  Initially, Truman
supported Barkley, but changed his support to Harrison
for reasons that are largely unknown.  Before switching,
he told Barkley, “The pressure on me is so great that I am
going to ask you to relieve me of my promise.” (Barkley,
1954, p. 155)  The vote was close, 38 to 37 with Barkley
triumphant. (Gullan, 1998, pp. 117-8)  After the vote was
tallied, Harrison stepped forward and moved that the
vote be made unanimous.
The newly elected Majority Leader quickly realized
the difficulties of his position. Early into his term, several
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Alben Barkley. Year 1949
Republican senators unexpectedly introduced an antilynching bill. (Davis, 1979) This angered the southern
Democrats who quickly threatened to filibuster. Barkley
was surprised by the Republican bill and attempted to adjourn the Senate, which would have cleared the agenda
for the day. His efforts were blocked by a coalition of both
Republicans and liberal Democrats. Republicans finally
agreed to withdraw the bill when Barkley assured them
that anti-lynching legislation would take top priority in
the next session. This battle over civil rights legislation
showed a major rift in the Democratic majority.  “As long
as the party’s agenda remained essentially economic,
its diverse elements held together. When confronted
with racial issues, however, the complex fabric began to
unravel.” (Ritchie, 1991, p. 134)  The tension between
the two factions would frustrate Barkley frequently in
his role as Majority Leader.
Barkley carried out his word and supported the bill
in the next session, but despite his best efforts he was
unable to overcome Southern filibusters. The Kentucky
Senator supported civil rights legislation throughout his
tenure as Majority Leader, earning him the admiration of
liberals. He was always willing to listen to conservative
views and work toward compromise, thus also earning
the respect of Southerners. His popularity among Southerners despite his stance on civil rights would prove to
be vital later in his career.
Barkley became a member of the “Big Four”
which included Vice President Henry Wallace, House
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Speaker Sam Rayburn, and House Majority Leader
John McCormack. (Hatfield, 1997, p. 425)   The four
met regularly with FDR to discuss the administration’s
legislative priorities and strategies. Barkley generally
led the president’s efforts, but in 1944 he broke with
him over a controversial tax bill. The president vetoed
a two billion dollar tax increase calling it relief “not for
the needy, but for the greedy.” Barkley was shocked by
the president’s actions. The tax bill had been the result
of hard work and compromise and the Majority Leader
felt it was the best he could do. The president knew his
feelings, but chose to ignore them.
The Majority Leader’s surprise quickly gave way to
anger; he discussed the matter with his wife and both
came to the conclusion that he would have to break with
the president. Barkley stayed up late into the night pacing
the floor of his room wondering how he would respond.
(Barkley, 1954, p. 175)  The next day he entered the Senate chamber determined to give a speech responding to
the president’s veto. The Kentuckian spoke with anger
that was rare for him. He saved special vehemence for
the President’s statement that the tax bill was for the
greedy, declaring in a speech in Washington on February
22, 1944, “That statement is a calculated and deliberate
assault upon the legislative integrity of every member
of the Congress of the United States.”   He ended his
speech by resigning as Majority Leader to the shock of
his colleagues. His speech was highly regarded by his
colleagues who showered it with applause. The next
day he was unanimously reelected to his position, and
Congress overrode the president’s veto.
The controversy over the tax bill seriously strained
Barkley’s and Roosevelt’s relationship, but because of
Barkley’s popularity the president moved to make public amends with him. He sent the Kentuckian another
“Dear Alben” letter on February 23, 1944. The president
declared, “Certainly, your differing with me does not affect my confidence in your leadership nor in any degree
lessen my respect and affection for you personally.”
(Barkley papers, Box 16, Folder 10)  Barkley accepted
the president’s gesture.  He graciously replied the next
day, “If we cannot trust one another in this tragic period
of our nation and of the world, how can the people trust
us?” (Barkley Papers, Box 16, Folder 10)  Despite the
exchange of letters between the two, their partnership
would never be the same.  

IV. Barkley and Truman
During the convention of 1944, FDR set out to find a
new vice president. The majority of the delegates favored Barkley but, “Roosevelt would not tolerate one
who had so recently rebelled against him.” (Hatfield,
1997, p. 425)   Roosevelt ultimately decided to pick
Truman over Barkley. Barkley later recalled that his
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relationship with Roosevelt improved after he campaigned vigorously for the Roosevelt-Truman ticket.
(Barkley, 1954, p.191)   When FDR died in 1945 it
was Truman who became president and not Barkley.
Barkley continued to serve as Majority Leader under
President Truman. The two men managed to work
reasonably well together, but their relationship was not
as smooth as Barkley’s and Roosevelt’s had been. This
unevenness was largely due to Truman’s difficulties
coordinating his office with the legislative branch. The
Senator often felt that Truman would launch a major
legislative effort without consulting the members of his
party beforehand. Still Barkley continued to work with
Truman on several pieces of legislation including the
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European Recovery Program. Dean Acheson, Truman’s
secretary of state, described Barkley as the president’s
“field commander.” (Acheson, 1961, p. 140)
Truman had numerous challenges awaiting him
after he took the oval office. With the end of World
War II, America had entered a new era in which a Cold
War with the Soviet Union was looming; and America’s
economy needed to be converted from wartime to peacetime. Americans turned to the new president to guide
them through these challenges, but quickly found his
leadership lacking. The new president, “suffered from
inexperience, a poor image, and bad advice.” (Donaldson, 1999, p. 7)  Truman’s difficulties can be seen with
the conversion of America’s economy. In order to hold

Photo Courtesy of UK Public Policy Archives

Leaving Blair House for the inauguration with President Truman, their wives, and the Trumans’ daughter
Margaret. Year 1948. Photo by John Adams
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President Truman, Senator Alben Barkley, Governor Simeon Willis of Kentucky. Year 1946
down inflation, Truman retained wage and price controls
that had been created during the war. Organized labor
was infuriated by the wage freeze and labor strikes occurred all across the country. Union strikes created even
more economic difficulty.  Consumers who believed that
economic prosperity had returned were frustrated by
Truman who was, “telling them that the products they
had been denied for so long would remain unobtainable
for a just a while longer.” (Donaldson, 1999, p. 14)  Republicans were quick to use this dissatisfaction to their
electoral advantage.
Americans vented their frustrations with the Truman
administration in 1946 by giving Republicans control of
both houses of Congress for the first time since 1930.
Republicans used messages such as, “Had enough?” and,
“To err is Truman” to recapture Congress. The New Deal
coalition that Roosevelt had worked so hard to foster and
maintain had seemingly fallen apart in the 1946 elec-
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tions. Liberals, conservatives, farmers, unions, African
Americans all had complaints, and Truman, unlike his
predecessor, was unable to walk the tight balancing act
required to satisfy one element of the coalition without
offending another. (Donaldson, 1999, pp. 6-7)   This
break up had caused the Democrats historic losses,
which caused the Democrats to turn their frustration
on Truman.
Barkley became minority leader after the Democrats
lost their majority.  His first major decision as minority
leader would have implications that would affect the
1948 presidential election. The matter involved Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, a segregationist who
had been accused of fraud. Barkley worked out a compromise with the new Majority Leader Robert Taft that
allowed him to be seated. Bilbo died shortly after this,
but Barkley’s actions confirmed in “the mind of many
southerners that Barkley was a man whose word they
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could trust.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 118)  The Kentuckian was
unique because he was popular with all segments of the
Democratic Party.
Many of the actions of the Republican Congress
infuriated Barkley. He was especially angered by the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed government
injunctions in labor disputes to weaken organized labor’s
strength. The Minority Leader encouraged Truman to
veto the bill and was dismayed when Congress overrode
the veto. After the passage of Taft-Hartley, Barkley could
be seen wearing a tie that stated, “Repeal Taft-Hartley
Act.” (Libbey, 1979, p. 93)  The law was particularly
frustrating because it seemed, “Americans had tired of
reformist crusades, and the slide toward conservatism
allowed Republicans to throw damaging punches at New
Deal ideas.” (Libbey, 1979, p. 93)  To a Senator from
Kentucky who had dedicated his life to many different
reforms, this trend was particularly disheartening.  
Besides facing difficulties in the public arena,
Barkley also had personal problems to deal with at the
same time, the most serious of which was the deteriorating health of his wife Dorothy. The expensive costs
of medical treatment and nursing care had forced the
couple to sell their Washington home and move into an
apartment.  Barkley began accepting speaking engagements all across the country, “to provide the treatment
and the special nursing care that she needed.” (Barkley,
1954, p. 71)  On March 10, 1947, Dorothy passed away.
(Louisville Courier Journal. March 13, 1947)  Her death
was a crushing blow to Barkley, but did not stop him
from continuing to serve as Minority Leader.

V. Barkley and the 1948 Election
With the Republicans firmly in control of Congress many
people were predicting that the Republicans would
capture the White House in 1948.   Barkley was not
optimistic going into the election. In a May 19th letter
to his friend Claude Bowers, Barkley expressed his feelings about the circumstances: “I deplore the situation
in which our party has been placed with regard to the
coming contest.” (Barkley Papers, Box 65, Folder 11)  
He disagreed with Bowers’ suggestion that he challenge
Truman for the nomination writing that, “In many ways,
he has not done a bad job of administering the government.” (ibid.)  Barkley believed that most of the mistakes
Truman had made had been of a political nature. He
agreed with the president on most issues, but felt that
his poor communications with Congress had created
unnecessary difficulties.
He offered the example of civil rights.   Barkley
had always favored equal rights for all Americans; in
Congress he had consistently voted against the poll tax
and in favor of anti-lynching laws, but he believed that
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compromise was necessary. Truman, he argued, had
tried to do too much at one time.  In the same letter
to Bowers, he stated that the administration, “threw a
whole basket full of matters in the lap of Congress at one
swing and the result has been that it has injured him… in
the South and it is doubtful whether it has helped much
in the North.” (ibid.) Barkley believed that the situation
had calmed somewhat, but that it was still tenuous.
Barkley’s frustrations with Truman did not make
him look upon the other political party favorably. The
Senator believed that the Republicans had nothing to run
on in 1948. He bluntly wrote to Bowers, “I realize that
after 16 years the people make up their minds to change
party control of their government, but the Republicans
really have nothing constructive to offer.” (ibid.)  Barkley
further argued that the New Deal coalition of Roosevelt
had accomplished a great deal in the sixteen years that
it had controlled the government. Barkley thought that
Senator Taft was the best of all the Republican candidates
calling him, “honest and courageous.” (ibid.)  He still
thought that the Democrats could beat him and any other
Republican candidate, despite the mood of the party.
Many Democrats were convinced that the 1948
election was going to be a disaster for the party, unless they found somebody to replace Truman. People
began to approach Barkley to convince him to challenge Truman for the nomination. They feared that,
not only would Truman cost them the election, but that
his civil rights platform would split the party irreversibly. Barkley refused to accept any of these overtures.
With the party’s national convention approaching, the
solicitations became more fervent. Earle Clements, the
Democratic National Convention – Ed Halsey presents gavel to Senator
Alben Barkley (Left to Right) Ken Romney, Ed Halsey, Pat Haltigin, Alben
Barkley, Clarence Cannon, Joe Sennot. Year 1932

T h e U n i v e r sit y o f K e n tuck y J ou r n al o f U n de r g r aduate S c h ola r s h ip

Photo Courtesy of UK Public Policy Archives

A l b e n W. B a r k l e y : H a r ry S . T
Unexpected Political Asset

81

Photo Courtesy of UK Public Policy Archives

Oliver J. Carter, Chairman Democratic State Central Committee of California; Alben W. Barkley, Vice President; E. George Luckey, Vice Chairman,
Democratic State Central Committee. Year 1949
Governor of Kentucky at the time and the leader of the
Kentucky Democratic Party, was one of the people who
approached Barkley about running for president. Barkley
refused to go along. Writing to a friend about the matter,
Clements explained, “The entire Kentucky delegation did
everything within its power to bring this about, but at the
expressed wish of the Senator himself, it was necessary
that we limit our sight to the Vice Presidential nomination.” (Clements Papers, Box 228, Folder 2)  Despite all
the attempts to make it otherwise, Barkley remained
loyal to Truman.
J. Howard McGrath, the national chairman of the
Democratic Party, selected Barkley to give the keynote
address at the convention. Historian Neal E. Claussen
argues that Barkley was selected again for several reasons, but the most important one stemmed from his
popularity in the South. Claussen explains that Southern
frustration over civil rights had increased the likelihood
of Southern democrats leaving the party, causing the
national committee to name “two Southerners to the
top convention offices, Barkley as temporary chairman
and Sam Rayburn as permanent chairman.” (Claussen,
1979, p. 82)  Barkley went to the convention determined
to make the most of the opportunity to give one last
keynote address.
The Democratic convention began on July 10, 1948.
The delegates who attended the convention were a
forlorn group, convinced that the party had no chance
of victory in November. The New York Times noted, “It
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is a simple statement of fact, not an editorial judgment,
to report that the majority of delegates assembled here
have no enthusiasm whatever over naming him [Truman] as their standard-bearer for 1948 against Gov.
Thomas E. Dewey.” (Lawrence, 1948a, p. E7)   The
mood of the Democratic delegates was in stark contrast
with the Republican convention that had been held in
Philadelphia two weeks before. According to the article,
“The Republicans were certain of victory, no matter
whom they nominated.” (ibid.)  The mood of his party’s
convention did not go unnoticed by Barkley who later
remarked, “When I got over there on Saturday before
the convention, you could cut gloom with a corn knife.”
(Shalett, 1953)  Barkley entered Philadelphia determined
to rouse his party out of the stupor into which they had
fallen.
On July, 12 Barkley delivered his address. The
speech was a call to arms to all the Democrats who
heard it. Barkley attacked the record of the 80th Congress and tied the Democrats to the New Deal and FDR.
Claussen writes, “Barkley knew that Democrats had
little to cheer about since 1946 and realized defeatism
could be surmounted by arousing a sense of pride.”
(Claussen, 1979, p. 85)  By using the accomplishments
of the New Deal, Barkley turned the focus to the previous
and more popular president Roosevelt. In his address,
the Kentuckian proudly declared, “In the first place, it
was recovery. The new administration breathed into
the nostrils of every enterprise, large or small, a breath
of new life and new hope and determination.”   The
Senator made the argument that Democrats who had
created the New Deal had helped people in their time
of need; while the Republican Party had fought it “as
if it were some blight or plague that had poisoned the
lives and consumed the liberties of the people and kept
them chained and helpless.”
The New Deal had helped all segments of society
Barkley argued. Farmers benefited from programs that
had brought electricity to a large swath of rural areas for
the first time, price controls had given them a stable market, and soil conservation had led to better crops.  The
elderly found financial protection with Social Security.
Laborers had profited under a federal government that
supported a worker’s right to organize, demand better
working conditions, and receive a minimum wage.  The
upper classes were not left out of Barkley’s speech. He
mentioned several programs such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the
Reciprocal Trade Agreement, and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation.   Barkley argued that these programs had created higher employment levels, increased
production, and prosperity for all.
Barkley attacked the Republicans in his Keynote address for doing nothing to help people during the Great
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Depression and for having no accomplishments since
recapturing Congress. Barkley challenged the convention
audience: “Let us ask, and let the American people ask,
those who spray this forest of superb accomplishment
with the froth of their vindictive lips, which tree will
they cut down with their mighty ax or puny hatchet?”  
With this question Barkley implied that Republicans
would dismantle the New Deal if they regained the
White House. He used his famous sense of humor to
dismiss Republican promises to eradicate bearcats by
defining one, “as a Democrat who holds some office that
a Republican wants.”  The Republicans’ record, Barkley
declared, “is one of things promised and not consummated.”  Barkley historian James K. Libbey argues that
Barkley’s attacks on Republicans for inaction established
the Eightieth Congress’ “do-nothing” reputation that
both he and Truman would use during the campaign.
(Libbey, 1979, p. 95)  Barkley avoided the civil rights
issues and ended the speech with a prayer.
The crowd’s spirit had been buoyed by the Kentuckians’ magnificent oratory. Cheering had erupted
throughout the speech. A journalist who covered the
event observed that Barkley had been encouraged before
the speech to give a short address “but the interpolations and the applause his remarks brought made it at
least 68 minutes.” (Lawrence, 1948b, p.1)  The cheering
after Barkley finished continued for half an hour as the
orchestra played “My Old Kentucky Home.” (Davis,
1979, p. 359)  Barkley’s speech lifted the gloom from
the convention hall in Philadelphia. Clark N. Clifford,
Truman’s political strategist, wrote to Barkley a few days
later, on July 19, “Your keynote address was the turning
point in the convention. It gave life to the meeting and
hope and inspiration to the delegates. It was a masterful
job and all good Democrats are grateful to you.” (Barkley Papers, Box 27, Folder 13)  Talk began again about
replacing Truman on the ticket, but Barkley ended it,
saying to anyone who proposed it to him, “If anybody
puts my name in nomination before this convention for
President of the United States, I will arise and renounce
it, because I will not come here as a candidate.” (Shalett, 1953)  Barkley was much more open to the idea of
running with Truman.
The delegates at the convention wanted Barkley
to be selected as the president’s running mate. Truman
was not thrilled by the prospect.  His first pick had been
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. The president
wanted Douglas because “the liberal Democrats were
about to bolt the party with Henry Wallace, the naming
of such a popular liberal as Douglas could be conceived
as an act of party unification.” (Claussen, 1979, p. 898)  
Henry Wallace had served as Roosevelt’s third vice president and served as Truman’s Secretary of Commerce.  He
and many other liberals in the Democratic Party thought
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Vice President Alben W. Barkley speaking. Year 1949

the administration was too conservative on issues such
as civil rights and too hawkish in foreign policy.  These
disenfranchised progressives were encouraging Wallace
to run for president with the Progressive Party. Truman
hoped to counteract them by nominating Douglas as his
vice president.  During the convention, Clifford was in
contact with Douglas encouraging him to run, but he
was unsuccessful.  Douglas decided to remain on the
Supreme Court. (Heiss, 1971).
After his keynote address, the delegates at the convention were firmly behind Barkley for vice president.  In
support of their “Mr. Democrat” the delegates launched
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a 28 minute demonstration to pressure Truman to select
him. (Lawrence, 1948b, p. 1)  The President did not want
Barkley because he was seventy years old and because
he brought no regional balance to the ticket.  Truman’s
lack of enthusiasm frustrated Barkley who remarked
to several reporters in Philadelphia, “I never cared for
cold biscuits.” (Barkley, 1954, p. 198)  Truman’s lack
of support for Barkley did not matter after the speech
because, “The convention made up the President’s mind
for him.” (ibid.)  McGrath phoned the Chief Executive to
inform him that the delegates were demanding Barkley.
Truman gave in to the pressure and telephoned Barkley
and asked him to be the nominee. Barkley replied, “Well,
I suppose I will accept it if I’m nominated, but I’m not
going to lift a finger to get the nomination.” (Shalett,
1953)  The delegates would do all the work for their
beloved Senator.
On July 13, William Wyatt of the Kentucky delegation nominated the minority leader.  In his speech he
described Barkley as man “to be counted on.”  Wyatt
declared, “He has the heart for the struggle, the courage
for the fight, and all that it takes to carry our banner
to victory on November 2.”  Barkley was selected by
acclamation. (Lawrence, 1948c)   After his selection,
Barkley gave a brief speech in which he promised to
follow Truman’s leadership, the party’s platform, and

Senator Barclay Speaking at Mammoth Cave Dedication. Congressman
Earle C. Clements is seated at far left, and Kentucky Governor Simeon
Willis is seated at the right of the podium. Sept 8, 1946
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to work toward victory. (ibid.)  Truman then gave his
acceptance speech in which he promised victory and
attacked the Republicans declaring “the country cannot
afford another Republican Congress.” (ibid.)  During his
acceptance speech the president announced he was calling a special session of Congress to give the Republicans
the opportunity to enact their convention’s platform into
law. (ibid.)  Truman hoped the Republicans would fail
to do so, cementing public opinion against them.  The
Democrats left the convention hall with a ticket, but few
expected the pair to be victorious in November.
The Democratic National Convention ended dramatically.  The adoption of a strong civil rights plank
over their objections had infuriated much of the Southern
delegation.  New York Times reporter W. H. Lawrence
noted, “For the first time in many years the Presidential
nominee’s selection was not made unanimous.” (ibid.)  
Half of Alabama’s delegation and all of Mississippi’s
walked out. Hubert Humphrey had pushed through
the plank and had led the effort that ended Southern
attempts to add a states’ rights plank. Shortly after
the convention, the Democratic Party would have two
schisms. The far left wing of the party led by Wallace
formed the Progressive Party. (Hagerty, 1948, p. 36)  
The disillusioned Southerners formed the States Rights
Party and nominated Strom Thurmond, the Governor
of South Carolina, for president. (Popham, 1948, p. 1)  
Barkley was needed to limit the electoral damage of the
southern bolt.
The special session of Congress worked exactly the
way Truman hoped it would.  The Republicans failed to
enact any major initiative and Barkley led the Democrats’
efforts during the session. (ibid.)  On the last day of the
session, the Minority Leader attempted to pass a broad
anti-inflation bill.  Reporter William White noted, “The
last main stand of the Democrats was made deliberately
to highlight a single issue, that of high prices.” (ibid.)  
The Republicans defeated Barkley’s bill and passed
their own much less encompassing version. (ibid.)  The
defeat frustrated Barkley so much that he shouted, “The
theme song of the Republican Party between now and
November should be ‘I’ve got plenty of nothing’.” (ibid.)  
Because Republicans failed to pass any major piece legislation, “Dewey was denied the ammunition he could
have used to wage an aggressively unified campaign.”
(Gullan, 1998, p. 110)  Barkley’s efforts to pass major
legislation while the Republicans blocked it created the
image Truman hoped it would: Democrats lead and create prosperity while Republicans only make promises,
but in actuality “do-nothing.” The Republicans had given
the Democrats the major theme of their campaign.
During the special session, Barkley and Truman met
to map out a strategy for victory. Barkley was expected
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to play a significant role in the campaign. Barkley
commented on this:
Well of course, it was expected that I’d take
an active part in this presidential campaign, as
a matter of fact, more active than the President
himself, because he had to remain in Washington a portion of the time.  He couldn’t just
start out and spend six weeks on the stump
without going back to Washington, but I could
because Congress was not in session, and I had
no other task except to help win the election.
(Shalett, 1953)
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age.  He would prove them wrong.  Early in his political
career he had earned the nickname “Iron Man” because
of the energy he had when he campaigned.  This vitality was seen when he ran for county attorney, county
judge, Congress, and Senate.  It would not abandon him
while he campaigned for the vice presidency.  He was
especially invigorated for the 1948 race.  Barkley, who
had recently lost his first wife, “found the campaign a
tonic.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 119)   To deal with his grief,
Barkley campaigned harder than he had before.
President Roosevelt signing the Social Security Act, Congressman Robert
L. Doughten, Senator Alben Barkley, Senator Robert F. Wagner, Frances
C. Perkins (Secretary of Labor), Senator Pat Harrision, Congressman
David J. Lewis, among others. August 14,1935
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Some doubted that Barkley could maintain the
vigorous campaign schedule necessary because of his
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In order to meet his obligations to the campaign,
he suggested a “prop-stop,” meaning he could travel the
country by plane. Eventually the Democratic National
Committee agreed to his request and chartered a DC-3
plane named “The Bluegrass.” (Davis, 1979, p. 264)  
Barkley’s extensive use of the plane for campaigning was
the first time this had ever been done in the United States.  
The plane included a bunk, and Barkley was accompanied by two-speech writers, a secretary, two journalists,
two pilots, a campaign manager, and two stewardesses.
(ibid.)  Barkley would make the most of these resources
and by the end of the campaign he had covered more
ground than any of the other candidates.
Harold Gullan believes the two men determined

that Truman would, “make major addresses in cities in
such states as New York and Pennsylvania that he was
unlikely to carry hoping his message would resonate
widely.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 116)  While Truman mainly
focused on large states and on national issues, “Barkley
was able to tailor his appeals to more localized issues. He
focused his attention not only on the South and later on
the Midwest, but also on states with key Senate races.”
(Gullan, 1998, p. 117)  Barkley was admired within all
segments of the Democratic Party. With the party split
three ways, this was extremely important. His popularity with the Southern wing of the party was needed
to ensure that on Election Day the Dixiecrats would
not expand from their “four-state base” of Alabama,

Figure 2b. Devil’s Looking Glass. Photo by Charles Swedlund, Richard
Young pictured.

86

K A L E I D O S C O P E

2 0 0 8

Photo Courtesy of UK Public Policy Archives

Clark Griffith, Vice President Alben Barkley, and Connie Mack at the opening of Baseball Season. Year 1949
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Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina. (Gullan,
1998, p. 124)  Truman was charged with limiting the
impact of Wallace and the Progressive Party. (Gullan,
1998, p.125)
After a brief trip to Rome for a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union, the Senator returned to begin
his campaign. In New Orleans on October 16, he used
many of the themes that he would use throughout the
South.  Barkley declared, “It cannot be denied that a vote
for any other ticket than the regular Democratic Party
ticket is in its effect a vote for the Republican Party.”  In
the same speech, he argued that the Republican Party,
“has not understood the South or its problems, and has
permitted and even encouraged the exploitation of the
South by those same plutocratic interests which have
always dominated the Republican Party.”  In his address,
Barkley did not refer to Thurmond except by inference.
(New York Times, 1948a)  The crux of Barkley’s argument was that by voting for a third party, the South lost
and the Republicans won.  Republicans, according to
Barkley, had never cared for or understood the South
and they never would.
In his appeals to Southern voters, the Senator was
always sure to mention the historic relationship between
the South and his party. In Asheville, NC, on September
27, he stated, “It would be a tragic thing if the partnership between the Democratic Party and the South were
to be destroyed.”  Barkley mentioned the contribution
of famous Southern Democrats like Thomas Jefferson
in his address. While campaigning in Nashville, TN, on
October 18, he offered the example of, “Woodrow Wilson
who gave to the Democratic Party the world vision from
which it has not departed.”  In these addresses Barkley
showed why he had been nicknamed “Mr. Democrat”
with praises of the party, declaring in his Nashville
speech, “The Democratic Party is the oldest, most experienced, and most representative political party in the
nation.”  With his oratory, Barkley built an image of the
South and the Democratic Party united in their goals and
in their history. He portrayed the candidacy of Thurmond
as an assault on an almost holy union.
Barkley’s meetings with local politicians during his
southern campaign swing were an important part of his
efforts. According to Gullan, “Barkley’s most important
exercises in persuasion were conducted off the podium,
in private talks with Southern officeholders, many of
whom were old acquaintances.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 125)  
This was a logical role for Barkley to fulfill.  While he
had supported civil rights legislation throughout his
career, he believed strongly in compromise, making
him more acceptable to Southerners.  Also, his work as
Minority Leader in 1946 to allow Senator Theodore Bilbo
of Mississippi to be seated, despite charges of corruption, had been appreciated.  In large part, his popularity
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Vice President Barkley addressing the dedication of
Ashland, the Henry Clay Estate, in Lexington, Kentucky. Year 1950

with Southerners stemmed from his personality.  Dean
Acheson, Truman’s Secretary of State, wrote of Barkley
that he “was not only the most popular man in the
Senate, but easily the most popular in Washington. He
was warm because he had a deeply affectionate nature
and really liked people.” (Acheson, 1961, p.140)  People
responded to Barkley’s warm personality, allowing him
to connect with voters, gain important positions, pass
legislation, and work out compromises. In his conversations with Southern politicians, Barkley would remind
them that a, “Republican victory might cost them their
influence, if not their jobs.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 125)  Barkley was mostly successful in his talks with Southern
leadership.
Due to the importance of keeping the majority of the
South Democratic, Barkley’s speeches were methodically
crafted. Gullan writes that Barkley’s Southern speeches,
“were carefully prepared, tailored to his specific audience, and devoid of the humor he usually employed.”
(Gullan, 1998, p. 124)  This was the only leg of the campaign where Barkley relied heavily on his speechwriters.  Once Barkley moved to other parts of the country,
his natural and humorous speaking style returned.  In
Dover, DE, on September 22, Barkley made a rare mention of Dewey’s name when it began to rain, ending
his speech early, he jokingly said, “I don’t want you to
get wet. In fact I don’t even want you to get dewey.”
Local issues were mentioned in his speeches.   While
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enacted, but toward the end of the campaign it would
prove to be a deciding factor in the election.
The Democrats were the first to realize the potential
potency of this issue. Gullan asserts, “By September
Clifford was fully alert to this almost providential new
issue.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 151)  Truman would first use the
issue for partisan advantage during a campaign stop in
Dexter, IA.  Declaring that the GOP stands for “gluttons
of privilege,” he accused Republicans in Congress of
working to destroy the small farmer. (Lawrence, 1948d,
p. 1)  After attacking the Republicans for changing the
CCC he loudly proclaimed:
There is only one way to stop the forces
of reaction. Get every vote out on election day
and make it count. I’m not asking you just to
vote for me. Vote for yourselves, vote for your
farms, vote for the standard of living that you
have won under a Democratic Administration,
get out there on election day, and vote for your
future. (ibid.)
Visit to Sicily and Rome, American Cemetery at Anzio, Italy, together
with Senator Lucas, and Congressman Reed. Standing by an American
coffin. Year 1947
in Greeley, CO, on October 5, he focused on electrical
issues, public water usage, and land development.  In
Greeley, the Senator stated, “of course, you know that in
the Republican dialect socialization means anything the
government does on behalf of a lot of people, while the
American Way means anything the government does for
an influential few.”  Barkley’s humor made his attacks
on the Republicans less mean and more effective.
An unexpected issue of the campaign was the
farmer’s need for storage space for surplus crops like
wheat and corn. 1948 had proven be to a good year
for agriculture. In previous years the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) was allowed to lease extra facilities
so farmers could store their surplus. In June, Congress
revised the CCC’s charter so that the organization could
only rent office space. (Gullan, 1998, p. 150)  This change
meant that farmers had to sell their surplus quickly,
which in turn drove down prices. Historian Zachary
Karabell explains:
Though the Republican platform alleged a
commitment to price supports, by stripping the
CCC of its role in renting or constructing storage buildings, Congress essentially drove down
agricultural prices. At the same time, the cost
of manufactured goods was rising. With less
income from their farms, farmers were being
Figure 4c. Standing Rock. Photo and digital filtration
by Charles Swedlund, pushed to the brink. (Karabell, 2000, p. 210)
The change was little noticed when it was first
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The people who heard the president were, in the
words of one observer, “an interested crowd, but not a
very demonstrative one.” (ibid.)   Truman’s speech at
Dexter was a good example of the president’s “weakness
of political positioning and rhetorical stridency.” (Gullan,
1998, p. 119)  The president’s penchant for overusing
drama in his speeches often weakened their impact.
Despite the lack of an enthusiastic response in Dexter,
“a seed had been planted.” (Gullan, 1998, p. 152)
The seed “would be cultivated by Alben Barkley,
making his impact on the second critical region that
determined the outcome of the election.” (ibid.)  Barkley
used the farm issue to the ticket’s advantage throughout
his tour of the Midwest and far West.  The issue was
mentioned by the candidate in Iowa, Minnesota, Kansas,
Idaho, Montana, and many other places. He accused
the Republicans of having no farm policy, declaring
in Kansas that the Republican policy “would neither
protect the gains of the last sixteen years nor provide
adequate growth in the future.” (New York Times, 1948b)  
In Mankato, MN, on October 3, Barkley mentioned the
CCC issue specifically and asked, “If the Republicans
are elected in November, what can we expect them to
do next year?”  Barkley was later criticized for the tactics he used when courting the farm vote.  But despite
these criticisms “his campaign methods… had certainly
worked.” (Gullan, 1998, p.155)
The farm vote had traditionally gone Republican
until Roosevelt, but in 1940 and 1944, it started to vote
Republican overwhelmingly again. Barkley had always
thought that victory was possible, but he had not been
sure of it until he reached the Midwest. He later told an
interviewer, “And when I got out into the . . . what they
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called the Corn Belt out in the Middle West, the great
agricultural states, I began to feel that the tide was in
our direction.” (Shalett, 1953)  By using the frustration
of farmers to the Democrats’ advantage, Truman and
Barkley had managed to capture a significant portion
of the Republican base. In 1948, the Republicans’ mistakes on agriculture policy hurt them significantly with
a normally reliable part of their base.
Throughout the race, Barkley attacked the record of
the Republicans and defended the accomplishments of
Democrats. According to Barkley, in 1929, Hoover had
brought the country to the brink of ruin, but the efforts
of Roosevelt and the New Deal saved the nation. Remarks
like this helped to give Democrats a sense of pride in
belonging to their party. Barkley’s speeches instilled
a sense of confidence in the party’s base about their
chances in November. Speaking before a labor union,
a major part of the Democratic base, in Wilkes-Barre,
PA, on September 19, he declared that Republicans
were scared because, “They know they deserve to be
the minority party because they represent a minority
of the people, whose spokesman are the Grundys, and
the Pews, and the special interests.”  The laborers loved
the Senator’s remarks and interrupted with applause
several times.
Barkley managed to convey a sense of hope to the
Democratic Party that they could win despite the elites
of political punditry predicting their efforts were useless.  
Take for example a widely circulated issue of U.S. News
and World Report (October 15, 1948) that appeared
weeks before the election with the cover declaring,
“‘Popular vote close electoral vote heavy for Dewey’ says
George Gallop.”  Largely because of Barkley’s efforts,
Democrats did not give up. Davis writes, “Probably the
greatest contribution of the Democratic vice-presidential
nominee was his ability to inspire party workers with
his own optimistic outlook.” (Davis, 1979, p. 266)  Republican overconfidence about their certainty of victory
caused laziness in their presidential ticket, their political
strategist, and their party workers.
Truman and Barkley continued their vigorous campaign until the eve of Election Day when the two men
returned to their hometowns.  Truman gave one last radio
broadcast after Barkley introduced him.  Speaking from
Paducah, KY, on November 1, in his introduction Barkley
recalled Roosevelt’s death and Truman’s ascension to the
presidency.  Barkley stated, “Now that his [FDR’s] great
personality had merged with that of other great men in
the eternity of the ages, all eyes and hearts turned to the
man who under our Constitution grasps the pilot’s wheel
of our ship of state.”  Truman, according to Barkley, had
been a magnificent leader.   He declared that Truman
“brought strength to our economy, expansion and per-
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manence to our influence and hope to hopeless men and
women throughout the world.”  After his introduction,
Barkley placed his hands in his pockets and went into
his bedroom, closing the door.  He would not reappear
for several hours. (Gullan, 1998, p. 174)

VI. Conclusion
On Election Day, Americans headed to the polls convinced they would have a new president. They were
wrong.   The popular vote was close with 24,104,836
going to the Truman- Barkley ticket and the Dewey-Warren ticket earning 21,969,500 votes. (Davis, 1979, p. 268)  
In the Electoral College the Democrats had won 303 to
189. (ibid.)  Despite the predictions of the press, polls,
and people, Truman and Barkley emerged from the hard
fought campaign as victors. Barkley later bragged to his
friend, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo L. Black, on
November 19, that their victory “confounded the metropolitan press, the poll takers, the radio commentators,
and the general assembly of pessimists who thought
this election was over before the Convention met in
Philadelphia.” (Barkley Papers, Box 65, Folder 12)  To
another acquaintance, Earle Clements, Then Governor
of Kentucky, he wrote the Democrats won because “the
people did their own thinking and their own victory.”
(Clements Papers, Box 229, Folder 3)
Barkley’s efforts were a major contribution to the
Democratic victory. With his plane, “The Bluegrass”
Barkley campaigned in 36 of the 48 states, gave 250
Barkley watches and posses as the sculptor makes the
final cuts to his bust. Year 1956
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he would give his final speech before his sudden death.
(New York Times, 1956)
Since his death, Barkley has been largely forgotten.
This is unfortunate because Barkley was a major force
behind many of the political decisions made in the first
half of the twentieth century that continue to shape
American political discourse to this day. His efforts during the 1948 campaign have been largely overshadowed
by President Truman. Barkley contained the Dixiecrats
to their four states and kept the rest of the South in the
Democratic column.  His work in the Midwest led to
the Democrats capturing states that had gone for Dewey
only four years earlier such as Iowa and Minnesota.  He
convinced the party’s base not to give up despite all
polls and pundits declaring their efforts worthless. These
factors contributed greatly to Truman’s victory in 1948,
but have received little attention from historians.  Even
though Barkley has passed from the memory of most
Americans, his legacy still lives on.
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